Of course there is redundancy. And with the Army becoming more involved in smaller unit operations, there will be even more redundancy….
Interesting article, even with its very obvious biases. And why is that so? Simply because the US taxpayer can no longer afford the size of the current budget, and the first and most obvious place to include in cuts will be the DoD budget. Let’s face it, the party days are coming to a close, and we can honestly expect a significant cut in the overall DoD budget; 25% or more is entirely in the realm of possibility. Simply stated, we can no longer afford to have significant levels of redundancies in capabilities and mission sets.
And what does this have to do with the article’s original question: Do we really need a Marine Corps? It ultimately comes down to “what does the Marine Corps bring to the fight (what is the Corp’s current role and mission set), and what SHOULD that be (where are the redundancies that we can get rid of).
Is the Army becoming more involved in small unit ops? Certainly. But since WWII, hasn’t the USMC significantly expanded ITS role to become its own self-sufficient Army, with large force capabilities that we’re traditional Army roles prior to WWII? Can we still afford to have this “second Army”?
Let's not call it amphibious operations but forward deployed rapid response operations. Until there is no need for this, and I cannot imagine it ever happening, there will be a need for the Marines. With the new Osprey they are even more valuable.
Ah, you’ve hit upon perhaps the most important role and mission set of the USMC (and traditionally the one the USMC was originally designed for, second only to ship-to-ship boarding responsibilities and keeping the peace on board): the ability to land ashore to secure ports of entry for follow on forces. The USMC is still VERY important for this role, and any talks of budget cuts based on re-establishing roles and responsibilities needs to keep this in mind. That is why I think the USMC has a proper function, and why it should remain.
What needs to happen now in this age of reduced budgets? A serious review of ALL roles and mission sets for ALL the services, where we can discover where these redundancies exist and provide justification for them if able. Without serious justification, these redundancies need to be reduced. The USMC is an excellent rapid reaction force towards establishing ports of entry from the sea and have the ability to be self-sufficient for a short period of time. But beyond that, do they really need to be able to fight 100s of miles ashore for extended periods (which they currently do and have been doing for a while now)? Isn’t that the Army’s job? Isn’t the Army’s airborne division just as capable of establishing ports of entry? The issue becomes can the 82nd sustain ops for an extended period without support; the USMC brings this sustainment capability with it when they embark (lesson learned from Guadal Canal).
As to the value of the new Osprey? Yet to be determined, as it mission rate hasn’t lived up to expectations. It does bring high value to the fight, but there are definitely cheaper (but less capable) alternatives.
Doesn't 90% of the world's population live in rather close proximity of a coastline. A coastline that can have a Navy amphib parked there within no more than 72 hours? And with a little forewarning, immediately.
Certainly. But the 82nd’s task is to be there within 24 hours, not 72. With forewarning, either can be there immediately, but I think the enemy would be a little better prepared to defend their shores if they observe an Amphib Group sitting on their coast, don’t you? An airborne assault has a little better element of surprise.
But like I said, the 82nd can’t sustain itself for an extended period like the USMC. But these shorelines areas usually have an airfield nearby. Air cargo can follow hours behind the 82nd and be up and running logistics support within days, if required.
But overall, I still see the value of the USMC. But I can seriously contemplate a massive cut in their force size and mission set. A lot of folks I’ve been talking to in OSD and the halls of Congress are contemplating the same as we speak…
There is a lot of skill and expertise involved in getting Marines on and off ships expeditiously and safely. I don't feel that it is something that the Army could do without devoting units exclusively to that tasking and allow personnel to remain with that speciality (which is exactly what the USMC is).
Keeping that skill and expertise takes a LOT of money. Personally, I think it is worth it, as this mission set remains a distinct possibility in the future. Beyond this mission set? The USMC has a tough sell to keep their current capabilities to go deep inshore and stay there for a while…
Remember that the biggest problem with the Army is that it still is indeed an Army.
Amen, brother! From my own personal experience, I couldn’t agree more!
Still doesn’t take away from the fact that the Army should be the fighting force deep in country for months at a time, which the USMC duplicates right now.
The posted article is so full of bias and misinformation that it isn't even worth reading.
Agree on the bias. Perhaps some misinformation, but from my personal experience in the theater they mentioned at the time frame mentioned (Battle of Fallujah, Najaf, and the Triangle of Death), it brings up some accurate points.
And like I said, it starts a conversation publically that needs to be started given current fiscal realities…..