This should make you very uncomfortable.

Doesn't make me uncomfortable. Abuse of such a commander by a CIC or otherwise would get swift voter retaliation. Rather save lives when a disaster strikes.
 
I understand the "rather save" mentality but the plan, as presented in the article doesn't do that. It just blurs the lines. First, all domestic federal responses are headed by non-DOD departments or agencies. DOD support can be requested, but the response remains the job of a federal agency's leadership.

Above that general response framework, active duty DOD officials are not known to "speak the language" of civilian agencies, whether that be at the national, state or local level.

I was at a school in 2009 where an uninformed, or misinformed Air Force Lt. Col. proceeded to cover the national response framework. She was under the impression that DOD would take over a response. Nope.

Katrina was headed first by Brown at FEMA and then Vice Adm. Thad Allen with the U.S. Coast Guard. While Lt. Gen. Russ Honore provided the media with great one liners, his understanding of the response, and how agencies at different levels relate, was underwhelming to say the least.

The National Guard and Air Guard are there work for the state governor when needed. There is absolutely no need to include active duty DOD officials in that fold. None at all.
 
I see what LITS is saying. But i also agree with how hornet perceives the combined mission. I think in an ideal world, it wouldn't be a problem.

Here's my suggestion.

In time of war, guard members are assigned overseas and are assigned to the DOD under control of the commander in chief. Basically, they become active duty military members and fall under the DOD.

So why not have the reverse? If a state, like Louisiana has an issue like katrina, and they need/want/request assistance from the DOD/President for active duty military support, then why not just allow the active duty members temporarily assigned to that domestic location, fall under the direction and authority of that state's governor and guard unit.

1. You maintain the cohesiveness that they are looking to do by not having different authorities, but you put the authority with the local state.
2. Instead of a guard member becoming a temporary active duty member, make an active duty member a temporary duty guard member. If we can have members of our military assigned to NATO and similar, we surely can have some temporarily assigned to a guard unit.
 
I

So why not have the reverse? If a state, like Louisiana has an issue like katrina, and they need/want/request assistance from the DOD/President for active duty military support, then why not just allow the active duty members temporarily assigned to that domestic location, fall under the direction and authority of that state's governor and guard unit.

Mostly because of Posse Comitatus.... and we should not have active duty U.S. military operating on U.S. soil.

Why? Well, because I don't trust them, not stateside. I don't want a group of people who have learned the rules of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, well learned, having deployed multiple times, to then have to make the differentiation between what use of force is in Afghanistan against the bad guys, and how to handle Joe Blow American who expects to interact with forces who are trained.


Example: Joint exercises in the Gulf of Mexico with the federal government and DOD brought a very interesting test. Hurricane rolling into the gulf, oil rigs abandoned, terrorist threat. Navy ship IVO oil platform observes small craft heading towards platform. They hail the vessel. No reply. Navy commander hails of more time, and then fires (destructive).

"WHOA WHOA WHOA" says Coast Guard LE officers associated with the drill. "You can't shoot at that boat in U.S. waters"

"Yes we can, we were protecting the platform from an attack" says the Navy.

"You're in U.S. waters and there is no threat to human life. Destructive fire is not authorized. What if this is a fishing boat heading to the rig to fish for species that like to hide near the rigs?" says the Coast Guard.


I don't trust the soldier, Marine, sailor or airman to enforce U.S. law or act within the U.S. borders. I trust them to no end overseas.

Now come on, you have countless members of local, state and federal agencies, many many law enforcement agencies, and other who are trained and well practiced it working within the United States. Active duty military is not needed. Not here.
 
I'd say we need to be cautious about this, but not necessarily alarmed.

If a large disaster struck, and local/guard units were not able to deal with the situation, sending in some AD personnel could help. This "Dual-Hat" idea can deal with that IF it is organized well (without severe risk to Civil Liberties).
 
Perhaps children should be issued their own little daggers and be ready to turn their parents in. If the strain is so great that AD must be brought in for Guard, why not divert Guard home and send AD troops where they were meant to be.
 
Children have been trained to turn their parents in, first during the "war on drugs" and now to CPS if they are disciplined. But that is another topic. I agree with LINS, civilian issues require civilian responses; if military precision is required a governor can call in the guard. FEMA has already overfederalized disaster relief and caused way more problems than they solve. My town was inundated-literally- by a hurricane after Katrina; nearly 3 years later we are enslaved by FEMA regs. Let's not make it worse with even more federal involvement.
 
Agree with jj - some of the military commanders I deal with have difficulty understanding civilians during a normal work day. Throw in a major disaster and multiple federal, state, and local civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations and it's a recipie for chaos.

Aside: This line from the article made me say "Huh? Isn't that what their all supposed to be doing?"

Paul Stockton, assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense.
 
This should make you....

Question - This is a possible move to have the CIC use the military for disaster response and get rid of FEMA? For some reason in the back of my head was not this a military role in the 1960's or so.

RGK
 
Not sure I understand what the fuss is all about, and I'm positive this article is nearly a decade behind in the times.

A simple review of USNORTHCOM's mission statemetn should suffice for now:

http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html

"USNORTHCOM conducts homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests."

Nowhere does it state the USNORTHCOM will LEAD the efforts for natural disaster events such as Katrina. It is, instead, providing civilian leadership military support as required during these times of crisis, providing a unified chain of command and oversight for all miltiary operations supporting these efforts.

Based on the confusion during Katrina, something LITS specifically mentions, having a unified command in charge is a GOOD thing.
 
The unified command already exists. I dare to assume many in DOD have no idea what ICS is, have not completed the training, and have no idea how they would fold into a response.

NORTHCOM is "homeland defense". Many believe "homeland defense" and "homeland security" are one in the same. They are not. NORTHCOM commander described it as "homeland defense starts at the border and looks outward, homeland security starts at the border and looks inward". Anything happening with in the United States would most likely be a "homeland security" issue, which is what DHS sec. would request assistance from DOD (through NORTHCOM) if needed.
 
The unified command already exists. I dare to assume many in DOD have no idea what ICS is, have not completed the training, and have no idea how they would fold into a response.

And I'll dare to assume back that quite a few directly assigned to USNORTHCOM would take exception to your statement.

NORTHCOM is "homeland defense". Many believe "homeland defense" and "homeland security" are one in the same. They are not. NORTHCOM commander described it as "homeland defense starts at the border and looks outward, homeland security starts at the border and looks inward". Anything happening with in the United States would most likely be a "homeland security" issue, which is what DHS sec. would request assistance from DOD (through NORTHCOM) if needed.

Look again at USNORTHCOM's mission statement. Security cooperation is clearly and sepcifically mentioned as one of their prime duties. Are they the "security experts" in coordinating the ovreall effort? Certainly not. At the tactical level does the primary mission of the active force perfectly match the requirements and activities involved in homeland security operations? Again, certainly not, and you give some very good examples at the Tactical level where active duty forces do not understand the nuanses of a tactical situation involving homeland security operations.

But the article is discussing strategic command and its implications.
Having a leader at the strategic level who understands the nuances of coordinating security AND defense operations on US soil, and whom utlimately has single "belly-button" authority to make command level decisions and guidance based on that knowledge... That IS a good thing. Maintaining two seperate beuracracies with two seperate leadership chains leads to examples like the response efforts during Katrina, where beuracratic in-fighting and lack of coordiantion led to tragedy.

Training future leaders to understand the process and be prepared to act as the recognized lead to best coordinate military forces in response to civilian need makes you uncomfortable?
 
Violating current law or blurring the lines makes me uncomfortable and is not needed.

Believe it or not, it was an Air Force Lt. Col. who incorrectly briefed the role of NORTHCOM, and its role in a federal response. It was also the comments of a flag officer at NORTHCOM during a national exercise that prompted the Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard to get on the phone with the DHS S-2 to address that very thing.

That bell button authority exists, just not in DOD. Maybe that's why DOD wants to push this.
 
"Perhaps children should be issued their own little daggers and be ready to turn their parents in. If the strain is so great that AD must be brought in for Guard, why not divert Guard home and send AD troops where they were meant to be. "


Could we give them matching uniforms?
 
Absolutely! Little tan ones.

As long as they are not Khaki.....



I feel that there is a valid points to both sides. In theory, one man who could control both the AD and Guard units in a time of emergency should be able to resolve the issues faster. However, the other side obviously feels that this is a breech of States rights. One could argue that when someone loyal to the federal govt has the ability to take over the armed militia of a state, then bad things could happen. Of course that is a very extreme example, but a valid point none the less.
 
There's no need for active duty acting within the borders of the U.S. in a response, so there is no need to coordinate between National Guard and AD units.
 
There's no need for active duty acting within the borders of the U.S. in a response, so there is no need to coordinate between National Guard and AD units.


That's pretty inaccurate and is more about bureaucratic turf protection than streamlining effective assistance to the civil population in times of disaster. To begin with - invoking Posse Comitatus is a red herring- Posse Comitatus is a limitation on LAW ENFORCEMENT activities of active military troops- not civil disaster response - In fact the Active Duty DoD has a long history as well as recent experience in providing major support to civil domestic disaster relief. Federal law identifies lead agencies for providing disaster response and limits the length of time that DoD AD foces can be used without a declaration by the President:
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/wombwell.pdf

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Title 42 USC 5121 et seq.) of 1979 establishes the statutory framework for Federal emergency relief operations. Under the auspices of this act, the President, at the behest of the governor, can declare an emergency or major disaster in the affected state. Once made, the declaration opens the way for extensive Federal assistance to the state and local governments. More specifically, the President can direct the Department of Defense to assist with relief operations by providing food, water, ice, and shelter to victims; conducting search-and-rescue missions; and using engineering assets to remove debris and to open up vital roads and public buildings.61 Additionally, the President can direct DOD to perform “emergency work” for up to 10 days without making an emergency or disaster declaration.62
However, AD forces have in recent memory both contributed and been the lead agency- for example:
Two major hurricanes hit the United States during the 1992 storm season. Hurricane Andrew ravaged the south coast of Florida on 24
14
August 1992. Until Hurricane Katrina, Andrew was considered the most destructive natural disaster to ever hit the United States. In south Dade County, 100 square miles were completely destroyed, and 200 more square miles were significantly damaged.31 In the United States and throughout the Caribbean, 60 people were killed. Hurricane Andrew caused $33 billion in damages, leveled 80,000 homes, displaced 250,000 people, and produced 20 million cubic feet of debris that required removal.32 Then, on 11 September, Hurricane Iniki struck Kauai, the westernmost island in the Hawaiian Island chain. A Category 4 hurricane, Iniki was the most devastating hurricane to ever hit the Hawaiian Islands and, up to that time, one of the most destructive to ever hit the United States.33 Three people were killed, 14,340 homes were damaged or destroyed, 7,000 people were left homeless, and 8,000 more needed food and water. Almost 70 percent of the island sustained damage from the storm, which was later estimated at $1.6 billion.34
In both cases, Active component and National Guard troops responded to the disasters. The Hurricane Andrew relief mission was predominately an Active-Duty mission. The governor of Florida activated 600 National Guardsmen before the storm struck. Although they were in position to conduct search-and-rescue missions once the storm passed, they were quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the destruction. Consequently, President George H.W. Bush decided to use Active forces to relieve suffering in the state. Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew was established on 28 August. More than 22,000 soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 1st Corps Support Command, and other services participated in this mission.35 Because they were not immediately pushed into the area devastated by the storm, the units involved had time to plan and tailor their forces to the expected tasks. Their initial focus was on tending to the needs of the survivors by providing food, water, shelter, medical support, and security. As the situation stabilized, these units shifted to the second phase of operations: recovery. During this phase, they restored public services, repaired schools, cleared roads, and removed debris.
Two units involved in the Hurricane Andrew relief operation were the 20th Engineer Brigade and the 1/22d Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division. The 20th Engineer Brigade received notification that it would deploy to support Hurricane Andrew relief efforts late in the day on 27 August, 3 days after the storm struck. The brigade’s assault command post arrived in Florida at 0530 the next morning and headed toward its operating area. What the engineers found appalled them. Five days after the hurricane had struck, the situation on the ground was still bad. The relief mission was disorganized, little aid was getting to those in need, roads were blocked by debris, electricity was out everywhere, and telephone communications were mostly inoperable. Based on that assessment, the engineers decided to add extra bucket loaders to their equipment list.36 By 2 September, four engineer battalions had deployed to the area.37 Once the initial relief missions, such as road clearance, were completed, the emphasis shifted to recovery missions. The engineers cleared debris so that disaster assistance centers, life support centers, and mobile kitchens could be set up to provide critical support to the victims. They also began restoring schools and removing the debris piled up at schools, parks, and other public places.38 Conditions continued to improve so that, by 20 September, the engineers were able to redeploy.39
The 1/22d Infantry assumed duties as the division ready force (DRF) for the 10th Mountain Division on 28 August 1992. As a lead element in the Nation’s rapid deployment force concept, the DRF had to be ready to deploy on 18 hours’ notice.40 The battalion got word at 1800 on 29 August that it would be deploying as part of JTF Andrew to provide disaster relief to Florida citizens. The next morning, the battalion embarked and flew to Florida. When it arrived, it was assigned an operating area and told to get to work. Based on its mission assignment, the battalion prioritized its work as follows:
• Dispose of any item judged a hazard to the health of citizens or soldiers.
• Distribute food and water.
• Remove debris.
• Ask residents what help they needed to restore their lives.41
The battalion was also responsible for several mobile kitchens, which served almost 900,000 meals during the first 33 days of operation. Debris removal missions were conducted using organic equipment such as handsaws and chain saws and contracted bulldozers and dump trucks. One officer in the battalion recalled that contractors would work for the first military unit that contacted them, so units competed with one another to commandeer as many dump trucks as possible so that they could clear more territory.42 By the end of September, the situation on the ground began to improve and the battalion began planning its redeployment. It returned to Fort Drum, New York, on 7 October, after 40 days of relief operations.43

The question isn't " do active duty forces have a role to play in Civil disaster relief"- it's clear that they legally and historically do. This is about how they best fulfill that mission and ensure that there is an effective command and control coordinating headquarters to coordinate all of the military assistance. Northcom already has that mission in its charter - this merely streamlines that mission execution.
 
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In 2009 I attended a briefing with the NORTHCOM commander, who, without hesitation, declared it was not the mission of the active duty U.S. military under his command (duel hat NORTHCOM and NORAD) to lead a response within the borders of the United States. He did say his people were available for a SUPPORT role. I'm comfortable with that. There is nothing in their training, contrary to fun National Guard recruiting videos or Navy "Global Force for Good" commercials that leads me to think the Department of Defense is good at domestic response. What do they have? They have hauling power and they have money. They've haven't been the easiest groups to work with and again....it's hard for the Department of Defense to ask for more money while declaring their stretched thin, while attempting to expand their role in everything else....they aren't good at it. National Guard/Air Guard troops I worked with at the oil spill last year weren't the happiest folks to be deployed for two months are returning home from Iraq. It's a power grab by DOD....nothing more....a way to justify not having budgets cut. "We need a huge Navy".....not because we've had a naval battle in the past 40 years, but because of "a global force for good". It's a sham.
 
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