General’s A-10 treason comment

Adhering to the moderator's admonition to keep it civil, I'm still unsure why viperdriver felt the need to question Raimius' credentials without offering anything on his own expertise, as such questions tend to be born of one man's belief that the other lacks said expertise. Viperdriver, I see you've updated your profile to include your grad year and airframe (it did not appear to be there yesterday, hence why I asked).

What's your take? Are you experienced in CAS? Is the F-35 the equal of the A-10 in the CAS role, or is Raimius correct?
 
Scout, it's always been under your profile page/information and I didn't change anything yesterday so don't know where you were looking.

My apologies to all for appearing uncivil. However, why wouldn't one ask about ones background when someone is writing about CAS/F-35/ DODMERB / West Point or whatever? Would that give the reader information about the credibility of their post. I believe there is a difference between someone who has done CAS, requested CAS, controlled CAS, been an infantry guy on the ground that needed CAS, JTAC, etc. than lets say someone who hasn't done any of the above. It sort of lends credibility to their point from their experiences. But thats just my opinion and I could be totally wrong.

Is the F-35 equal to the A-10 right now today? Of course not, it's not even IOC'd. Will it be? I bet it will be even better. Does the F-35 have issues? Apparently so. But so did the F-22 when it came onboard. It is now the premier Air Dominance fighter in the world. Back to the F-35, I can tell you that the guys at the 422 flying it now love it. Plenty of gas, outstanding loiter time, gets somewhere fast, lots of SA, very capable, outstanding sensors, doing CAS with no problems, etc. I don't have to remind you of all people that CAS is killing bad guys in close proximity of friendlies where coord/integration is required. One shouldn't care if it's an A-10, F-22, Attack Helo, Bomber, etc. or whatever. The majority of CAS since 2003 has been done by aircraft other than A-10's and I haven't heard a lot of complaining. The Marine Corps has fully embraced the F-35 with it replacing AV-8 and F-18. They rely on FW/RW CAS more than the Army due to their lack of organic fire support. They ain't complaining.

Because the AF is going to a multi-role fighter to do CAS does this mean it'll be less effective than the A-10? I don't believe so with the capabililties that the jet will have.

Because the AF is getting rid of the A-10 (single mission jet for CAS/CSAR/FAC) does this mean that CAS is no longer a priority for the AF? I don't think so. The AF has always supported the Army with CAS since Vietnam and especially over the last 11 years. The majority of spinups and deployments since 2003 have all been about CAS.

Getting rid of the A-10 is a decision the AF feels it needs to make for fiscal reasons (that is what their experts say). Would it be great to keep a single mission a/c? Of course it would be, but they've determined that the money is needed elsewhere. Will the AF be successful in getting rid of it? I don't know with all of the congressional support, grass roots effort from the A-10 supporters, etc. It can be emotional whenever an aircraft goes away. I believe we are seeing this somewhat with the A-10.

Probably too much rambling....
 
viperdriver said:
However, why wouldn't one ask about ones background when someone is writing about CAS/F-35/ DODMERB / West Point or whatever? Would that give the reader information about the credibility of their post. I believe there is a difference between someone who has done CAS, requested CAS, controlled CAS, been an infantry guy on the ground that needed CAS, JTAC, etc. than lets say someone who hasn't done any of the above. It sort of lends credibility to their point from their experiences. But thats just my opinion and I could be totally wrong.
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If I may, you are not wrong. Rather you should get a feel for how this forum works. Don't know if you spend time posting on internet forums, but I believe each forum is different. What I learned from spending too much time on this forum last few years was limit/restrict my replies, read the whole thread, and qualify my replies. If we were having face to face discussion, many misunderstandings that occur on this forum will not happen. But, we are not having face to face discussions.

I might not like with your statements, but factually I cannot disagree with them. But I can disagree with how the fact is used or interpreted. For example, your statement of "The majority of spinups and deployments since 2003 have all been about CAS" is absolutely true. My guess is other missions were transport missions. My argument is that your argument is a false dichotomy - we have been doing CAS for last 10+ years so it proves that CAS was our priority. Other than CAS and transport missions, there was nothing else going on for the Air Force.
 
From what I read and conversations, the F-35's sensor suite and ability to integrate with others will be a huge SA builder. That's excellent, and will lend itself to many applications, including CAS.

The "single-mission" argument rings a bit hollow to me. The A-10 can do quite a few air-to-ground missions--much like the bombers, several types of RPAs, and a few other aircraft. About the only aircraft that do more than that are the F-22s, F-15Es, and F-16s, from what I can tell, since they also bring significant air-to-air capabilities. If you want to argue that we will need more air superiority and multi-role fighters, I think that is a sound argument for the F-35. Replacing the F-16 with the F-35 makes sense on the surface--they are both multi-role fighters. The F-35 for A-10 swap isn't a direct one, and invites a bit more scrutiny.

The other "iffy" argument is the survival one. The A-10 has taken significant beatings and returned to base, just as it was designed to do. Now, I'll agree that not getting hit is a better solution, but those arguing that the A-10 can't operate in a hostile environment seem to be ignoring history. Once the SEAD aircraft do their initial runs, the A-10 seems perfectly capable of operating in that middle-ground of hostility. (Based on unclassified reading.)
 
As a civilian with zero knowledge in this arena, I'm glad to see that civility has returned to this thread. Trying to understand the A-10 debate better (as opposed to the treason discussion that this thread started with), I ran across this article...

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/03/air-forces-argument-retiring-10-makes-no-sense/106845/

From reading this, it begs the question of if not the A-10, then which airframe along the continuum of missions do you discontinue with having the least impact on the missions that are the most likely and potential least painful (if a deficiency is exposed)? This is given the need to cut the amount that is said to be saved by the proposed A-10 scrapping.

Not trying to open a "my mission is more important than your mission" discussion, but I think reasoned folks can probably debate the pro/cons of any of these platforms and how "irreplaceable" they truly are.
 
My knowledge quotient is smaller than goaliedad's.

My question is about the survivability of the F35 vs. the A10. In similar missions, is the F35: 1)harder to hit 2) more likely to keep on fighting and fly away after being hit?

BTW The caption under this A10 photo was, "You should have seen the other guy."

warthogdamage.jpg
 
Very thorough discussion of the issue. The author has a very definite ground level point of view, but for those of us who have a hard time following the previous discussion, he explains things in easily understandable terms.

"Systemically analyzing measures of effectiveness offers the best chance of influencing key Congressional members. Senator Kelly Ayotte has led the Senate fight and appears focused on CAS effectiveness, which potentially contradicts her political interests—her state has no A-10s but is the fourth largest U.S. recipient of F-35 funding."

Now that Tom Coburn is gone, I think I have a new Senate hero(ine).


Read more:http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/...arthog-doesnt-add-up-heres-why/#ixzz3Tcf4AKB2

http://www.businessinsider.com/ben-...ument-to-retire-the-a-10-doesnt-add-up-2015-3

My only opinion is that the A10 looks totally bada$$.
 
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If I recall correctly her DH was an A10 pilot during Iraq and he is very active in that community. Not saying she doesn't believe in the argument....just saying before she is placed on a pedestal, I wonder if she would be vocal if her husband didn't fly the plane or if her DH believed the 35 could do the mission.

We have friends that flew the A10 and still believe it is the best airframe, but like goaliedad mentioned, find me one pilot that would step up and say get rid of the plane that I fly it is replaceable!
 
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I don't recall a single A10 pilot queried in the linked article. If anything, it is heavy on opinions from ground operators, of which the author was one.

I can certainly see Sen. Ayotte standing by her man and his airframe in some non-consequential discussion. I could even see her doing it in private discussions with officials from the DOD. I can't see her doing it with defense contractors. It isn't just the economic impact on her state. It is the economic impact on her campaign finances (and PAC if she has one). Why do you think seats on one of the Armed Services Committees of Congress are so prized?
 
I honestly have no bone in this fight. Keep the A10, cut it loose for all I care.

I was just responding to the heroine comment.

Do I think that every MOC has people talking in their ear? SHEAAT yes! Most of them with paid interests, at least for her, she gets it from living an AF life. I am not naive.

However, it is interesting to me that people have yet to see what the 35 can do regarding CAS and have decided sides. Look, Prince Harry when he called in CAS had an F15E from SJAFB respond not an A10. That mission was accomplished and the aircrew landed safely.

I believe in the A10. I think it is an amazing workhorse like The B52. I am not against it, but I am also not against the F16 being replaced by the 35. Nor was I against the F4/111 being replaced by the F15E. Or the C130H being replaced by the C130J. Time marches on and so does technology.

Have you looked at what the 35 does? The technology in this airframe? Or is it all just the delays and bugs they are working out and that it costs more money? Is it about reading what the media reports? If it is any of the latter, than let's just keep the 16s and A10. If it's about air superiority than be honest, the 35 can come in and do surgical airstrikes against infrastructure, like electrical, telecommunications and water plants, leaving our opposition with less options against ground troops. What does that leave them SAMs? The 35 can take them out. You don't need an A10 for that

Again, yes I believe they have a mission. I believe they save lives for our troops, but I also believe it comes down to how you attack it...offense or defense. The 35 is impo offense. The A10 is defense. Both are needed.
~ On another forum they have given a great suggestion. Let the Army have the A10s. A10s are called in by ALOs and ETACs. ALOs and ETACs work with the Army.

If the Army feels that the 35 can't do CAS, and the AF can't afford to keep them, than why not?
~ Please no budget defense as a reason. That doesn't float with me because for the AF that is their reason and the AF is much smaller than the Army. They are like the AF boneyarding airframes.
~~ The Army has just as much invested, probably more when it comes to CAS. It is their troops on the ground when it comes to completing the mission. They have aviation, why not train their pilots, be it AD, Guard or Reserve units? Why place this on the doorstep of the AIR Force when they too have AIR support? Convert these airframes to the Army.

I am naive on how it works regarding conversion, and I am sure scout will tell me I am ignorant, but that is my question. If CAS is about ground troops than why shouldn't the Army do it? Don't their helos also do CAS? Aren't the majority of their members on the ground?
~ ALOs are sent and trained through the Army via Hurlburt and Benning so they can be a liaison between the AF and Army.
~~ Wouldn't an Army Pilot flying the A10 cut through the middleman/woman?
 
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Do you mean JTACs? And the Army cannot have that offensive fixed wing capability per the Pace-Finletter MOU. The Army is also not interested.
 
My bad, when Bullet was an ALO with 82nd I recalled the enlisted members being called ETACs, but they were with JTAC. He was the only officer (ALO) in charge of the ETACs (enlisted). There were also BALOs. I bleive the Ar!my had equivalents called GLOs.

It was years and years ago.

Now let's address your latest comment. The Army is not interested in the A10. Please now defend to me why if the Army feels that the A10 is not worth the cost of the A10 to protect ground troops in their own budget why the AF should keep it in their inventory?

Honestly, you just proved the argument of why the A 10 should be boneyarded. The Army that calls in CAS has faith in the 35. They aren't fighting for the A10 and will not invest in it. It is the Army that will have troops at risk, not the AF.
 
Pima said:
Now let's address your latest comment. The Army is not interested in the A10. Please now defend to me why if the Army feels that the A10 is not worth the cost of the A10 to protect ground troops in their own budget why the AF should keep it in their inventory?

Honestly, you just proved the argument of why the A 10 should be boneyarded. The Army that calls in CAS has faith in the 35. They aren't fighting for the A10 and will not invest in it. It is the Army that will have troops at risk, not the AF.
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I'm not sure why you've decided to go on one of your trademark pointed diatribes toward me, but I'll gladly answer the question.

You're conflating two very different issues. You assume that the Army is not interested in the capability. That is not true. What the Army is not interested in is a program that it could in no possible way afford. The Army, thanks to sequestration and ongoing budget reductions, cannot afford the aircraft it currently owns. Hence the massive Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) through which the Army is currently suffering. Add to that, the Army currently must find a way to divest an additional 70,000 troops. You speak as though this is a matter of two rich misers arguing over who should pick up the check. That is hardly the case.

Furthermore, you also speak as though this is some simple case of a child demanding a toy, and the parent saying "if you want it, you pay for it." This is not just an issue of a piece of equipment. Legalities aside, even if the Army could accept the A-10, what would the Army do with it? The Army has no hangar space for A-10s. The Army has no maintenance facilities for A-10s. Nor maintenance units. Nor a fixed-wing jet pilot school. Nor a logistics chain for the A-10. In short, the Army lacks every single element of the DOTMLPF domain required to support the integration of the A-10. To create such an architecture would cost many multiples of what it would cost the Air Force to keep the A-10, plus the Army would still have an aging air fleet on its hands.

The question is a two-part issue, and that's what you're failing to recognize. If you ask the Army "Should we keep the A-10?", that is a capabilities question and the Army will approach it from a capabilities standpoint. The Army will likely say yes, because the Army needs the CAS capability (a capability for which the Air Force is the executive agency, but more on that in a minute). If you ask the question "Should we keep the A-10 or replace it with something else?" the question will likely be answered with "it depends what that something else is and what it can do for troops in contact."

If the question is "how should we pay for the A-10?" the Army will respond "that's your problem, not ours, we don't manage your budget." Fortunately that is not the question at hand, but it does bring us to the dichotomy of the great A-10 question: Is it worth having, and how does the Air Force pay for it if it is worth having? The former is a resounding yes. The latter half is much murkier. The issue the Air Force is facing, as we all know, is whether the famed replacement will actually deliver.

To illustrate the point, consider it from the other perspective. Say the Army was planning to mothball the M1 Tank. "But we have a replacement!" the Army says. "It's the Stryker MGS. It's not as survivable, lethal, or reliable as the M1, but that's the choice we made because it's newer and a jack of more trades." If we were to ask GEN Breedlove, the EUCOM commander, whether the Army should have the M1 tank, his answer would be a resounding yes. If we were to ask him how the Army should pay for it, he'd likely say "not my problem, but they need to." The Army's answer should not be the one you just gave, i.e. the petulant "well if you want that capability on the battlefield so badly, why don't YOU pay for it?" That ain't how it works. Similarly, if the Army said it was mothballing the Blackhawk, it should not expect the Air Force to suddenly become the executive agent billpayer for a new CSAR helicopter platform (though admittedly helicopters are slightly more muddled territory).

The Army is the Executive Agency and PM for armored vehicles. As such, the Army is the armored capability provider to the joint force by developing and funding the M1 tank for the Army and the tiny USMC armored force. (Remember, one team, one fight, as you like to remind us). The Army cannot abdicate that role. Nor can the Army just abandon the M1 without a suitable replacement for the capability, lest it put the joint force at risk. And joint force commanders would be right to chastise the Army for attempting to do so.

The Air Force demanded to be the Exec. Agency for all land-based/non-naval fixed wing offensive capability. That includes CAS. The Air Force's real problem in this situation is that they have not sufficiently convinced the joint community that the F-35 will be a viable CAS platform replacement for the A-10. I can't say whether it will turn out to be or not, but that's the issue among the services.

The answer is for the Air Force to maintain the same high quality of CAS they've provided with the A-10, and to do so without interruption. The answer is not to demand that the Army do the Air Force's job and create A-10 squadrons in the Army.
 
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Leave out the first sentence, and this is one of the most illuminating and cogent replies I've read on the topic.
 
MedB +1

Again, I have no opinion on the matter as to the proper solution to the problem. I always knew that the program was a huge domestic political behemoth, but all the intricacies of sourcing across so many states (to please constituents) and countries (to please their politicians and meet the needs of their militaries), and the complexity and variability of the F35's missions, combined with the well-informed inside baseball commentary of Scout, Bullet and others dealing with the needs of our own military is absolutely fascinating. Its like reading about the exercise and distribution of political and economic power throughout the Ottoman Empire.
 
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