US Cannot Sit Idly By

The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power
August 12, 2008 | 1508 GMT
http://www.stratfor.com
By George Friedman
The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in
Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity
for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet
sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8. Let's begin simply by reviewing the last few days. On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.

On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia,using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region's absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded - within hours of the Georgian attack - the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.

On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought
Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.

The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion. In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery
exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply.
 
CONT.
Georgia's move was deliberate. The United States is Georgia's closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia's mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to
forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians?

Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack? It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but- along with the Georgians - miscalculated Russia's intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the
Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion. If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region.

They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well - indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow's calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.
The Western Encirclement of Russia To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution
represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire. That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO's expansion to Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic - and again in the 2004 expansion, which
absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.
 
CONT.
The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia's national security. It
would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion - publicly stated - was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia. The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo's separation from Serbia.

The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts - including demands by various regions for independence from Russia - might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia's requests were ignored. From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict.

For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia. Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia,the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn't mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests.

As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.

Resurrecting the Russian Sphere Putin did not want to re-establish the
Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of
influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American
protection.
 
CONT.
Georgia was the perfect choice. By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well.

The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security. The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk. The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria. Therefore, the United States has a problem - it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran.

Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran - and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow's interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington). In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn't all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.

The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia's public return to great power
status. This is not something that just happened - it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that
would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.
 
I apologize for such a loooooong post. But I'd received this in an email from a Homeland Security guy who was trying to help me understand what is happening. He felt this a good lesson. Either that or he wanted to punish me by making me actually sit down & read, then think, on that darn thing. He knows I have the attention span of a sea monkey. :smile:
 
Oh, boy...

Russia: Poland risks attack because of US missiles
By JIM HEINTZ, Associated Press Writer Jim Heintz, Associated Press Writer – 37 mins ago

MOSCOW – A top Russian general said Friday that Poland's agreement to accept a U.S. missile interceptor base exposes the ex-communist nation to attack, possibly by nuclear weapons, the Interfax news agency reported.

The statement by Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn is the strongest threat that Russia has issued against the plans to put missile defense elements in former Soviet satellite nations.

Poland and the United States on Thursday signed a deal for Poland to accept a missile interceptor base as part of a system the United States says is aimed at blocking attacks by rogue nations. Moscow, however, feels it is aimed at Russia's missile force.

"Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself to a strike — 100 percent," Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of staff, was quoted as saying.

He added, in clear reference to the agreement, that Russia's military doctrine sanctions the use of nuclear weapons "against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them." Nogovitsyn that would include elements of strategic deterrence systems, he said, according to Interfax.

At a news conference earlier Friday, Nogovitsyn had reiterated Russia's frequently stated warning that placing missile-defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic would bring an unspecified military response. But his subsequent reported statement substantially stepped up a war of words.

U.S. officials have said the timing of the deal was not meant to antagonize Russian leaders at a time when relations already are strained over the recent fighting between Russia and Georgia over the separatist Georgian region of South Ossetia.

Russian forces went deep into Georgia in the fighting, raising wide concerns that Russia could be seeking to occupy parts of its small, pro-U.S. neighbor, which has vigorously lobbied to join NATO, or even to force its government to collapse.

Under the agreement that Warsaw and Washington reached Thursday, Poland will accept an American missile interceptor base.

"We have crossed the Rubicon," Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said, referring to U.S. consent to Poland's demands after more than 18 months of negotiations.

Washington says the planned system, which is not yet operational, is needed to protect the U.S. and Europe from possible attacks by missile-armed "rogue states" like Iran. The Kremlin, however, feels it is aimed at Russia's missile force and warns it will worsen tensions.

In an interview on Poland's news channel TVN24, Tusk said the United States agreed to help augment Poland's defenses with Patriot missiles in exchange for placing 10 missile defense interceptors in the Eastern European country.

He said the deal also includes a "mutual commitment" between the two nations to come to each other's assistance "in case of trouble."

That clause appeared to be a direct reference to Russia.

Poland has all along been guided by fears of a newly resurgent Russia, an anxiety that has intensified with Russia's offensive in Georgia. In past days, Polish leaders said that fighting justified Poland's demands that it get additional security guarantees from Washington in exchange for allowing the anti-missile base on its soil.

Somebody better start dusting off those Cold-War SIOP plans....
 
:thumbdown:Please, John Bolton, that's who you look at for foreign policy. That guy is the biggest chicken-hawk wingnut on Earth. He couldn't even get 60 votes for an appointment. Who do you get your civil rights opinions from? Robert Bork???


And you think President Bush will be able to unite the world against Russia? Do you want to look at his approval ratings in America, let alone the world?


There's three simple questions that can be asked and answered.

Would Russia have done this if we weren't bogged down in Iraq? No.
Would Russia have done this if Georgia didn't start shelling peacekeepers? No.

Will anyone take John McCain seriously when he said "21st century countries don't invade other countries" after we um invaded Iraq? Nice one.

It's pretty simple. Russia is going to withdraw after those two breakaway provinces get de facto independence. I know some people are getting happy dreams thinking about the return of the Cold War, but it's not happening.
 
Would Russia have done this if we weren't bogged down in Iraq? No.
Would Russia have done this if Georgia didn't start shelling peacekeepers? No.

Both of these questions seem to ignore well over half a century of past Russian history. Maybe you should have added "again" after "this".

And the fact that you think that Russia is concerned about the "INDEPENDANCE" of the areas...of course, Russia has always been concerned about that kind of stuff....tell Poland that, tell the Czech Republic and Slovakia that....Estonia....Latvia....the list goes on and on.

It's not about America united the world against Russia, it's about Russia uniting the former Soviet states against it, with it's aggressive actions.

Capital, you're turning a pretty blind eye to some very basic facts/themes in Russia's not so distant past.

What will happen in the end? Russia will pull out of Georgia, the Georgian president will remain, all parts in tact, and now the our plans with Poland will speed up. Should Russia "act" on the Russian generals thoughts of "100 %" action regarding Poland, the United States will get involved.

Why do you think the Sec. of Defense spoke about this? It's not because that's what he would normally talk about, no normally it would be Sec. of State....I thought it was very interesting when Sec. Gates was speaking about this...

John Bolton understood what most in his area refused to admit...the United Nations is useless, powerless, and on the decline.
 
:thumbdown:Please, John Bolton, that's who you look at for foreign policy. That guy is the biggest chicken-hawk wingnut on Earth. He couldn't even get 60 votes for an appointment. Who do you get your civil rights opinions from? Robert Bork???

You are invited to submit a cogent and persuasive counter-argument based on facts and logic. Since you consider to be such a "chicken-hawk wingnut", it should be an easy task for you. :wink:

The reason he could not get 60 votes is because too many people in Congress (i.e. - Democrats) simply despise the idea of a UN representative from the United States actually representing the interests of the United States. They'd much prefer a "citizen of the world". :rolleyes:

As for Judge Bork, I'll happily take his advice on civil rights or ANY Constitutional issue long before I take advice from the likes of what passes as the civil rights "leadership" in this country.

And you think President Bush will be able to unite the world against Russia? Do you want to look at his approval ratings in America, let alone the world?

I have no idea if uniting the world (or at least that part of the world that matters) is even possible in this case. After all, all Russia has to do to shut the Europeans up is to turn off the natural gas taps.

There's three simple questions that can be asked and answered.

Would Russia have done this if we weren't bogged down in Iraq? No.
Would Russia have done this if Georgia didn't start shelling peacekeepers? No.

First off, Russia would have done this with or without us in Iraq, and for the same reason: there is only the most minute chance that we will actually deploy ground forces (or any forces for that matter) there to defend the Georgians. Second, even if Georgia DID shell "innocent peacekeepers", the magnitude of the assault into Georgia proper was completely out of proportion, especially since Georgia was posing no threat to Russia.

Will anyone take John McCain seriously when he said "21st century countries don't invade other countries" after we um invaded Iraq? Nice one.

Only someone who is clueless of the facts, despises America, or both would conclude that there is ANY similarity between what the Russians have done and what we did in Iraq. Which category do you fall into? :confused:

It's pretty simple. Russia is going to withdraw after those two breakaway provinces get de facto independence. I know some people are getting happy dreams thinking about the return of the Cold War, but it's not happening.

You go ahead and keep thinking that. If not Russia then China. Probably both.

In the meantime, better people than you will continue to go into harm's way to defend your right to be so badly misinformed.
 
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Will anyone take John McCain seriously when he said "21st century countries don't invade other countries" after we um invaded Iraq? Nice one.
Only someone who is clueless of the facts, despises America, or both would conclude that there is ANY similarity between what the Russians have done and what we did in Iraq. Which category do you fall into? :confused:

i'm pro war-in-Iraq, but even i think this was a mis-statement by McCain. 21st century countries do invade other countries when we have a good reason to. the U.S. thought Iraq had WMDs at the time that we invaded. that was a good reason. it was clearly a reason that most of the rest of the world could understand. and it would be a reason to invade Iran or North Korea someday, if we can't solve things there through diplomacy. the russians thought the Georgians were being harsh on S. Ossetia. that is a bad reason to invade. certainly the scale of the invasion they made and the fact that after the georgians turned tail, the russians are still busy with their invasion. i think most of the rest of the world would agree this is a bad reason to invade. as Secretary of State Rice said, russia's response to Georgia was way disproportional to what the georgians did or even what the russians thought the georgians did. i think probably the right restatement of what mccain said would be "21st century countries dont invade other countries without first having dialogue and working at diplomacy."
 
i'm pro war-in-Iraq, but even i think this was a mis-statement by McCain. 21st century countries do invade other countries when we have a good reason to. the U.S. thought Iraq had WMDs at the time that we invaded. that was a good reason. it was clearly a reason that most of the rest of the world could understand. and it would be a reason to invade Iran or North Korea someday, if we can't solve things there through diplomacy. the russians thought the Georgians were being harsh on S. Ossetia. that is a bad reason to invade. certainly the scale of the invasion they made and the fact that after the georgians turned tail, the russians are still busy with their invasion. i think most of the rest of the world would agree this is a bad reason to invade. as Secretary of State Rice said, russia's response to Georgia was way disproportional to what the georgians did or even what the russians thought the georgians did. i think probably the right restatement of what mccain said would be "21st century countries dont invade other countries without first having dialogue and working at diplomacy."

I agree wholeheartedly. My earlier statement was not intended to give McCain a pass on his statement. It was obviously factually wrong and also sounded WAY too diplomatically cliched. Man has been invading his neighbors for the last twenty centuries (as well as who knows how many before that), so there is little cause to believe the 21st will be any different. It's sad, but true.

However, the statement was used as a tool to draw a moral equivalence between what Russia has done in Georgia and what we have done in Iraq. There is a HUGE difference as you have demonstrated.

Such a comparison is simply ridiculous, and says more about the person trying to make the point than it does about McCain or current events.
 
I agree w/ Zaphod. War in Georgia would be like Vietnam only worse if Russia will fight face-to-face and, Georgia will most likely be destroyed as middle-ground.

Personally, out-and-out war with Russia scares the hell out of me (not that I wouldn't fight it if asked, however).
 
I agree w/ Zaphod. War in Georgia would be like Vietnam only worse if Russia will fight face-to-face and, Georgia will most likely be destroyed as middle-ground.

Personally, out-and-out war with Russia scares the hell out of me (not that I wouldn't fight it if asked, however).

an all out war between the US and Russia or China even without nukes would make WW2 look like a child's game. its scary to even think about. :eek:
 
Looks like a return to the Cold War is inevitable now. Putin is posturing over Norway, Georgia is now half a country and Monday was 2 days ago, and Russian Bear bombers have been pressing US and Nato borders for months. Hindsight is 20/20 and unlike President Bush I think the soul of Putin is a bottomless pit of evil. Worst part is I believe we have no national unity and couldn't fight a warm or hot war with Russia.
 
Looks like a return to the Cold War is inevitable now. Putin is posturing over Norway, Georgia is now half a country and Monday was 2 days ago, and Russian Bear bombers have been pressing US and Nato borders for months. Hindsight is 20/20 and unlike President Bush I think the soul of Putin is a bottomless pit of evil. Worst part is I believe we have no national unity and couldn't fight a warm or hot war with Russia.

Can't argue with any of that. Dark times ahead. :frown:
 
Link to article.

Report from Tbilisi
Fleeing Russian brutality, Georgians look to the West for support.

Michael J. Totten
20 August 2008

Russia’s invasion of Georgia has unleashed a refugee crisis all over the country and especially in its capital. Every school here in Tbilisi is jammed with civilians who fled aerial bombardment and shootings by the Russian military—or massacres, looting, and arson by irregular Cossack paramilitary units swarming across the border. Russia has seized and effectively annexed two breakaway Georgian provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has also invaded the region of Gori, which unlike them had been under Georgia’s control. Gori is in the center of the country, just an hour’s drive from Tbilisi; 90 percent of its citizens have fled, and the tiny remainder live amid a violent mayhem overseen by Russian occupation forces that, despite Moscow’s claims to the contrary, are not yet withdrawing.

On Monday, I visited one of the schools transformed into refugee housing in the center of Tbilisi and spoke to four women—Lia, Nana, Diana, and Maya—who had fled with their children from a cluster of small villages just outside the city of Gori. “We left the cattle,” Lia said. “We left the house. We left everything and came on foot because to stay there was impossible.” Diana’s account: “They are burning the houses. From most of the houses they are taking everything. They are stealing everything, even such things as toothbrushes and toilets. They are taking the toilets. Imagine. They are taking broken refrigerators.” And Nana: “We are so heartbroken. I don’t know what to say or even think. Our whole lives we were working to save something, and one day we lost everything. Now I have to start everything from the very beginning.”

Seven families were living cheek by jowl inside a single classroom, sleeping on makeshift beds made of desks pushed together. Small children played with donated toys; at times, their infant siblings cried. Everyone looked haggard and beaten down, but food was available and the smell wasn’t bad. They could wash, and the air conditioning worked.

“There was a bomb in the garden and all the apples on the trees fell down,” Lia remembered. “The wall fell down. All the windows were destroyed. And now there is nothing left because of the fire.”

“Did you actually see any Russians,” I said, “or did you leave before they got there?”

“They came and asked us for wine, but first we had to drink it ourselves to show that it was not poisoned. Then they drank the wine themselves. And then they said to leave this place as soon as possible; otherwise they would kill us. The Russians were looking for anyone who had soldiers in their home. If anyone had a Georgian soldier at home they burned the houses immediately.”

Her husband had remained behind and arrived in Tbilisi shortly before I did. “He was trying to keep the house and the fields,” she explained. “Afterward, he wanted to leave, but he was circled by soldiers. It was impossible. He was in the orchards hiding from the Russians in case they lit the house. He was walking and met the Russian soldiers and he made up his mind that he couldn’t stay any more. The Russian soldiers called him and asked where he was going, if he was going to the American side.”

“The Russians said this to him?” I said.

“My husband said he was going to see his family,” she said. “And the Russians said again, ‘Are you going to the American side?’”

“So the Russians view you as the American side, even though there are no Americans here.”

“Yes,” she said. “Because our way is for democracy.”

Senator John McCain may have overstated things a bit when, shortly after the war started, he said, “We are all Georgians now.” But apparently even rank-and-file Russian soldiers view the Georgians and Americans as allies. Likewise, these simple Georgian country women seem to understand who their friends and enemies are. “I am very thankful to the West,” Maya said as her eyes welled up with tears. “They support us so much. We thought we were alone. I am so thankful for the support we have from the United States and from the West. The support is very important for us.” She tried hard to maintain her dignity and not cry in front of me, a foreign reporter in fresh clothes and carrying an expensive camera. “The West saved the capital. They were moving to Tbilisi. There was one night that was very dangerous. The Russian tanks were very close to the capital. I don’t know what happened, but they moved the tanks back.” And my translator, whose husband works for Georgia’s ministry of foreign affairs, made a similar guess that the West helped save the capital. “The night they came close to Tbilisi,” she said, “Bush and McCain made their strongest speeches yet. The Russians seemed to back down. Bush and McCain have been very good for us.”


Likewise, the women seemed to understand what Russian imperialism has always been about—and not just during the Soviet era. “Why do you think the Russians are doing this in your village?” I said.

“They want our territories,” Nana said. “Some of them are Ossetians, too, not only Russians, and not only soldiers. Some are there just to steal things, from Ossetia and Chechnya.”

Russia doesn’t want to annex Gori permanently, in all likelihood. But it does want, as it always has, a buffer zone between itself and its enemies. It was George F. Kennan, America’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, who said, “Russia can have at its borders only enemies or vassals.” Now, Georgia has been all but dismembered. The opening phase of this crisis may soon come to a close, but it is shaping up to be merely the first chapter in a potentially long and dangerous era. “We will never forget this,” Lia said. “Never. Ever.”

Michael J. Totten is an independent journalist based in Portland, Oregon. His work has appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and numerous other publications. The Week named him Blogger of the Year in 2007 for his dispatches from the Middle East. Visit his website at www.michaeltotten.com

Hyperbole or not, it makes you wonder if such an attitude is pervasive amongst Georgians, and what that could mean in the future.
 
Hmmmmm

If war broke out between the US and Russia....I don't even want to imagine it, but unless tensions flare down, we might very well expect a 3rd world war.
 
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