There goes the goat

obviously a convenient scapegoat, as with the unfairly blamed sailor on the U.S.S. Iowa. Appears there were much bigger failures up the chain of command as numerous officers have already been reprimanded.
 
obviously a convenient scapegoat, as with the unfairly blamed sailor on the U.S.S. Iowa. Appears there were much bigger failures up the chain of command as numerous officers have already been reprimanded.
Two different things.

Whether or not the fire was successfully fought, it could have been purposely started and likewise, whether it was arson or not, the
response by both the ship and the supporting forces was not acceptable.

It is not debatable that much of the ship's firefighting capabilities were inoperable due to the overhaul status but some of the issues
with fire boundaries not being able to be isolated and flammable material stowage might have been out of the realm of what the ship
could influence and that bears examination and course change.
 
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Why aren’t all major combustibles removed and/or significantly reduced prior to overhaul?

Is this a procedural deficiency?
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Two different things.

Whether or not the fire was successfully fought, it could have been purposely started and likewise, whether it was arson or not, the
response by both the ship and the supporting forces was not acceptable.

It is not debatable that much of the ship's firefighting capabilities were inoperable due to the overhaul status but some of the issues
with fire boundaries not being able to be isolated and flammable material stowage might have been out of the realm of what the ship
could influence and that bears examination and course change.
I hope this incident isn’t a symptom of deeper problems within the Navy, or if it is that they are identified and fixed.
The US Navy of WWII developed battle damage control that was second to none with many examples such as the Yorktown of seemingly mortally wounded ships being saved.
So how did we go from the Navy that saved the USS Forrestal to the Navy that lost the USS Bonhomme Richard in dry dock? Are the priorities in the right places?
 
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Why aren’t all major combustibles removed and/or significantly reduced prior to overhaul?

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Actually the opposite. While Ammunition is removed, the contractors bring on and off lots and lots of "stuff" and on an amphib like BHR, Lower V is a very convenient place to stage stuff - it has large drive through doors that can connect to the pier so that pallets of stuff, large machinery and equipment cabinets can be brought aboard and then move to wherever they go on the ship. Conversely, stuff coming off of the ship can be accumulated there to be palletized and moved off. Sometimes it can include solvents/cleaning stuff.
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More importantly, a space like Lower V has a LOT of fire protection systems built in because the "V" is for vehicles as the space is where trucks, Humvees and whatever are stowed when the ship loads out with Marines. The space is also built to be isolated so that a fire in the vehicles does not spread to the rest of the ship. During this overhaul (as is often the case), the built in fire protection systems were being worked on so they were tagged out (inoperable). The crew would have to use hoses and equipment form outside the space as they train. Also the built in isolation (fire boundaries) gets compromised when the contractor personnel run electric, air and other lines through the hatches which make them non-closable and thus a fire can spread.
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The navy recognizes that a ship in overhaul has fire protection "issues" and the base fire dept ("FEDFIRE") is supposed to come in and help fight any fires. Clearly in this case the level of coordination and cooperation between Ships Force, FEDFIRE and other Navy resources was both disjointed and slow to come online.
 
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I hope this incident isn’t a symptom of deeper problems within the Navy, or if it is that they are identified and fixed.
The US Navy of WWII developed battle damage control that was second to none with many examples such as the Yorktown of seemingly mortally wounded ships being saved.
So how did we go from the Navy that saved the USS Forrestal to the Navy that lost the USS Bonhomme Richard in dry dock? Are the priorities in the right places?
When the ship is not in overhaul and the crew is aboard, one of the first things done during a fire is to set fire boundaries both primary and secondary. This requires the people and especially the fittings (hatches, etc) to be CAPABLE of being secured. Once boundaries are set, the fire should be contained and easier to fight.
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When we're being overhauled, there is a constant tension between staying safe (fitting capable of isolating) and keeping the overhaul work on schedule. When the contractor has to spend too much time disconnecting and reconnecting constantly, it pushes out the schedule and increases the cost. This is a constant issue and not a new one.
 
When the ship is not in overhaul and the crew is aboard, one of the first things done during a fire is to set fire boundaries both primary and secondary. This requires the people and especially the fittings (hatches, etc) to be CAPABLE of being secured. Once boundaries are set, the fire should be contained and easier to fight.
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When we're being overhauled, there is a constant tension between staying safe (fitting capable of isolating) and keeping the overhaul work on schedule. When the contractor has to spend too much time disconnecting and reconnecting constantly, it pushes out the schedule and increases the cost. This is a constant issue and not a new one.
Obviously ship operations is not my specialty. I can only go off what I read.
“Training and Readiness. The training and readiness of Ship’s Force was marked by a pattern of failed drills, minimal crew participation, an absence of basic knowledge on firefighting in an industrial environment, and unfamiliarity on how to integrate supporting civilian firefighters. To illustrate this point, the crew had failed to meet the time standard for applying firefighting agent on the seat of the fire on 14 consecutive occasions leading up to 12 July 2020.”

“The considerable similarities between the fire on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fire of eight years prior are not the result of the wrong lessons being identified in 2012, it is the result of failing to rigorously implement the policy changes designed to preclude recurrence,” Conn wrote in his report.”

So again, where was the emphasis if not on this?


 
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Obviously ship operations is not my specialty. I can only go off what I read.
“Training and Readiness. The training and readiness of Ship’s Force was marked by a pattern of failed drills, minimal crew participation, an absence of basic knowledge on firefighting in an industrial environment, and unfamiliarity on how to integrate supporting civilian firefighters. To illustrate this point, the crew had failed to meet the time standard for applying firefighting agent on the seat of the fire on 14 consecutive occasions leading up to 12 July 2020.”

“The considerable similarities between the fire on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fire of eight years prior are not the result of the wrong lessons being identified in 2012, it is the result of failing to rigorously implement the policy changes designed to preclude recurrence,” Conn wrote in his report.”

So again, where was the emphasis if not on this?


I agree that ship's firefighting performance was poor, that is not questioned but in my opinion, the loss of the ship is more about the fact that the fire spread across the fire boundaries that could not be set.
My take is that IF the equipment had not been tagged out AND firefighting had been done well, it might have been a fairly minor amount of damage within Lower V and perhaps a bit of the Well Deck and Upper V.
Given the poor performance and lack of equipment then perhaps the damage would have been greater with significant damage to the Vehicle spaces and Well Deck area but the rest of the ship would still have been saved IF the fittings and accesses had been secured so the fire could not spread throughout the ship.
 
As a Marine who served on the maiden voyage of both the Boxer and the Essex both LHDs I can say with certainty that the sailors on these ships were absolutely prepared for whatever kind of fire you threw at them. I can say with the utmost certainty that this failure is a result of being in port and in dry dock trying to balance between military command and civilian resource. The communication between the two resources is certainly what ultimately caused this terrible incident. Blame who you like but this rests on the heads of the Admirals, not even the Captain. This is a procedural failure not an operational failure. They were trying to save money for toooooo long.
 
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