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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy...2804334.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009100401053
I am not sure what truly happened at Wanat as I was neither there nor have reviewed the entire investigation, but Gen Mattis and Gen Petraeous directed and reviewed the original investigation and found sufficient cause to issue Letters of Reprimand to the Battalion and Brigade Commander for failure to supervise and support the platoon in contact. I understand and somewhat sympathize with the "chilling effect" argument, yet from what I have read, there were some glaring errors in the placement of the OP and the plans to react and support in the case of an all out assault against it- failures which seem to me, as they apparently did to Gen Petraeous, to be largely failures of the chain of command.
I am not sure what truly happened at Wanat as I was neither there nor have reviewed the entire investigation, but Gen Mattis and Gen Petraeous directed and reviewed the original investigation and found sufficient cause to issue Letters of Reprimand to the Battalion and Brigade Commander for failure to supervise and support the platoon in contact. I understand and somewhat sympathize with the "chilling effect" argument, yet from what I have read, there were some glaring errors in the placement of the OP and the plans to react and support in the case of an all out assault against it- failures which seem to me, as they apparently did to Gen Petraeous, to be largely failures of the chain of command.
The Army's official history of the battle of Wanat - one of the most intensely scrutinized engagements of the Afghan war - largely absolves top commanders of the deaths of nine U.S. soldiers and instead blames the confusing and unpredictable nature of war.
The history of the July 2008 battle was almost two years in the making and triggered a roiling debate at all levels of the Army about whether mid-level and senior battlefield commanders should be held accountable for mistakes made under the extreme duress of combat.
An initial draft of the Wanat history, which was obtained by The Washington Post and other media outlets in the summer of 2009, placed the preponderance of blame for the losses on the higher-level battalion and brigade commanders who oversaw the mission, saying they failed to provide the proper resources to the unit in Wanat.
The final history, released in recent weeks, drops many of the earlier conclusions and instead focuses on failures of lower-level commanders...