Obviously ship operations is not my specialty. I can only go off what I read.
“Training and Readiness. The training and readiness of Ship’s Force was marked by a pattern of failed drills, minimal crew participation, an absence of basic knowledge on firefighting in an industrial environment, and unfamiliarity on how to integrate supporting civilian firefighters. To illustrate this point, the crew had failed to meet the time standard for applying firefighting agent on the seat of the fire on 14 consecutive occasions leading up to 12 July 2020.”
“The considerable similarities between the fire on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fire of eight years prior are not the result of the wrong lessons being identified in 2012, it is the result of failing to rigorously implement the policy changes designed to preclude recurrence,” Conn wrote in his report.”
So again, where was the emphasis if not on this?
A cascade of failures – from a junior enlisted sailor not recognizing a fire at the end of their duty watch to fundamental problems with how the U.S. Navy trains sailors to fight fires in shipyards – are responsible for the five-day blaze that cost the service an amphibious warship, according to...
news.usni.org
The following are the command investigation into the July 12, 2020 fire aboard the former USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the Major Fires Review. The pair of reports were released on Oct. 20. From the Command Investigation Executive Summary On 12 July 2020, a fire set USS BONHOMME RICHARD...
news.usni.org