Two Whistle approach?

[GWU PNS (emeritus)]

I'm not an expert on US Navy bridge procedures. I do have lots of expertise on U.S. Merchant Marine ship bridge techniques etc. During a recent visit to USNA, I had a conversation with two British Naval officers (SWO types-not sure of Brittish title). It turns out that the British Navy uses STCW (international merchant shipping competency standards) for the British Navy AND the British Merchant Navy. These two experienced officers, felt the STCW and licensing standards provided a lot of value to the Queens' Navy. Seems to me that Big Navy should look at these STCW standards. Also, it's easy to incorrectly conclude the root cause(s) without having all the facts of each case and the seeing what is similar among the cases.

The British Navy is an interesting hybrid of merchant marine type standards mixed with some Navy tactical training. While I do enjoy the standardization that the STCW brings into play, the challenge with using that for our Navy lies in how frequently someone needs to certify or recertify. If we followed that model, none of our SWOs would have the career timing to do anything other than drive ships and then recertify to drive ships. There would be no time to work in the Pentagon, or other major staffs, nor would we have the time to hone our tactical skills.

The British use a construct called the P-WO, or Primary Warfare Officer. Those officers spend their careers doing tactics, and that's it. They rely on the others to handle engineering or deck evolutions. And that model is great and it works for a small Navy. If we were to hold up a map of the world and show the US Navy presence versus Britain or frankly any of the NATO navies, we'd enjoy a good laugh. It is good to have allies, but they do not cover the scope that we do.

I sometimes wonder if we could develop our own hybrid where we keep at least one very seasoned Merchant Marine Officer onboard Navy ships who could help with training, and in complex seamanship periods, be a sort of Gray Beard mentor to make sure things stay calm. But that requires budget expenses, and if there is one thing I have seen in the surface Navy, we never seem to get our due when it comes to the budget. Nuclear Navy takes the highest priority, then aviation, maybe SWOs then. SpecWar budget is classified so I didn't even factor them in.

At the end of the day, if there was negligence by any SWOs on those two ships, then the hammer will fall. We have never been accused of going easy on ourselves when mistakes are made. But, there are things that need to be investigated, so I will keep my powder dry on that until there is more that is revealed after the investigation. As for gonavy14's comments about levels of incompetence, a review of your posts shows you focus on every mistake by every military community. It's America, so enjoy that freedom, but I wonder if it ever gets lonely on your lofty perch of perfection? (rhetorical question of course)

 

[OldRetSWO]

If "complex maneuvering" includes lifting small boats out of the water without giving those on said small boat a dark water swimming thrill then you probably won't like the next post either.

You just may want to look at what I posted in the other thread.

 

[conrack]

Just saw some additional info that pertains.
Harpers Ferry (the LSD) had been right of track due to prior meeting situation with Tripoli (carrier) and most
likely overcorrected on its turn which placed her on the wrong side of the channel. Lots
of internal discussions ongoing about the incident.

Tripoli is an America Class Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), NOT a carrier

 

[OldRetSWO]

Tripoli is an America Class Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), NOT a carrier

You are correct but know that as a former Amphib sailor who has deployed with LHAs as well as aboard CVNs,
I am extremely aware of the difference but the common terminology in the maritime world for a flat-topped ship
operating aircraft is "carrier" even though the US Navy separates them into "L" ships and CVNs.