F35 crashes in south china sea

Yeah, they did.

 
I may have missed it, but did they ever find the source of the leaked video?
 
If you read the entire, redacted, report. The F-35C has an automated engine control that ensures appropriate thrust on landing approach to the carrier. It was not engaged. In the pilots defense, it is in the checklist as "As Required." In this case it was clearly required. The accident report has stated that this will now be a required item on landing aboard.

And many approaches to carriers aren't just "eyeballs on the ball" anymore but automated using digital flight controls assisted by autopilot, etc. Again, not being an F-35C carrier qualified pilot, I'm "speculating" from my flying knowledge and from speaking with friends that were qualified carrier pilots. Their consensus was: "lots of things wrong here but bottom line, the pilot didn't notice the sink rate, the decaying flight path, and the imminent ramp strike." The report called this "pilot error." That's a damning conclusion.

Now, to my naval aviator friends here...the FNAEB will make a recommendation on the pilots future...with this kind of report, what would that "probably" be? Any educated guesses from past accidents?
@flieger83, I'm not a "Go Fast" guy but this part of the the mishap report had me wondering:

"77. The MP led his flight from two thousand feet to the initial when the flight deck was ready for the fixed wing recovery. Approaching the ship, the MP initiated an expedited recovery to the downwind. An expedited recovery maneuver is when an aircraft initiates a turn to downwind from either behind the ship or over the top of the ship. Based on airspeed, break location, and G[1]forces applied to an aircraft, there are various types of expedited recoveries (also referred to as a Sierra Hotel Break (SHB)). [Encl 7, 24]"

The pilot had never done an expedited recovery. Seems to me he got in over his head, and behind the aircraft (incomplete landing checklist, etc, etc). I imagine senior mishap board members might be questioning the decision for the "SHB"*. To me there were one too many headwork errors. A normal upwind entry into the pattern would given him more time to sort things out as suggested in the report. In aviation, as you know, headwork errors can be unforgiving. Lots to discuss at this FNAEB.

SHB* = Sh*t Hot Break

For other readers, the nitty gritty of the mishap report can be found here , page 7 starts the sequence of events:
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.militarytimes.com/assets/pdfs/1677091907.pdf
 
The APC component is listed in the landing checklist 'as desired'. That seems weird. If that function makes it more likely to have a safe landing, why wouldn't it be mandatory?

'As desired' sounds like something I would read in an invitation regarding the formality of one's wardrobe. Not the type of verbiage I would expect in a multi-million dollar aircraft landing checklist.
 
WT Door

Yep, that portion you cited: ""77. The MP led his flight from two thousand feet to the initial when the flight deck was ready for the fixed-wing recovery. Approaching the ship, the MP initiated an expedited recovery to the downwind. An expedited recovery maneuver is when an aircraft initiates a turn to downwind from either behind the ship or over the top of the ship. Based on airspeed, break location, and G[1]forces applied to an aircraft, there are various types of expedited recoveries (also referred to as a Sierra Hotel Break (SHB)). [Encl 7, 24]"

I know what an SHB is, I've done them in AF fast movers...they're "partly" for the expediency of entering and completing the pattern" but let's be honest, they're also about the "cool" factor. In the AF it's a quick "Call initial, break at the overrun, and put it on the ground..."

It works and looks great and IS expedient...but you better have it all worked out well ahead or...
 
WT Door

Yep, that portion you cited: ""77. The MP led his flight from two thousand feet to the initial when the flight deck was ready for the fixed-wing recovery. Approaching the ship, the MP initiated an expedited recovery to the downwind. An expedited recovery maneuver is when an aircraft initiates a turn to downwind from either behind the ship or over the top of the ship. Based on airspeed, break location, and G[1]forces applied to an aircraft, there are various types of expedited recoveries (also referred to as a Sierra Hotel Break (SHB)). [Encl 7, 24]"

I know what an SHB is, I've done them in AF fast movers...they're "partly" for the expediency of entering and completing the pattern" but let's be honest, they're also about the "cool" factor. In the AF it's a quick "Call initial, break at the overrun, and put it on the ground..."

It works and looks great and IS expedient...but you better have it all worked out well ahead or...
Roger all on the “cool" factor and looking good while doing it. I feel for the guy and wonder at what point after the break he started thinking “uh-oh”. It looks like hubris may have played a part in the young pilot’s mishap. BTW, the SHB asterisk was for those unfaniliar with military aviation parlance. I can imagine you, in your bird, doing a SHB in Kadena or Osan. Interesting reading on the mishap, eh?
 
Not a confirmed story, but from what I heard it was a Chief and an Ensign that got in trouble for it. Don't know exact punishments either, but I'd expect Captain's Mast and some not so fun things.
 
Now, to my naval aviator friends here...the FNAEB will make a recommendation on the pilots future...with this kind of report, what would that "probably" be? Any educated guesses from past accidents?

The mishap pilot kept his wings but is no longer is flying status.

For those not familiar, regarding the SHB, there is real utility in the maneuver (when perfectly executed, you are calling the ball at the exact moment the deck goes clear from the preceding launch), but in reality it's done because it's just really cool.

As an A-6 guy, we were usually stacked above the F-14 and F-18s during a case I (daytime) recovery, so we were rarely the first to break the deck, but got to do it once in a while. Being the lowest planes in the stack means you need to "hawk the deck" , watching the ongoing launch, and working your timing so that you are landing very shortly after the last plane launches, so you don't waste deck time. Usually that means when the last few planes are setting up to launch, you go 5 miles aft of the ship, drop down to 800' and turn in, plan to be overhead the ship when the last plan is on the cat. If you do it right, you are in the groove right after a clear deck.

A truly SHB means 400 kts +, and a 7g turn at the fantail (standard procedure is to break around 1 nm upwind of the ship). That results in staying at idle, trying to get dirty and slow down, not getting to onspeed till you're in the groove. There is a lot going on very quickly, still in a high AOB turn, still fast, looking up/left at the ship while descending and slowing and trying to make it all work out when you roll wings level behind the ship. What you normally have ample time to complete now needs to be done in seconds.

That is background for understanding this mishap. This pilot got behind the aircraft, lost SA, and missed a landing checklist item. When he realized what was going on it was too late.

As a result of this mishap, the procedures have been changed to make landing in auto mandatory. That is what they mean when they say "NATOPS is written in blood"
 
100% to the comment above . One of the first lessons taught to all flight students, that my DS now teaches to his flight students - "When in any doubt, go around" - fly the pattern, circle back around, get in an ideal position, and land safely. It's amazing when a pilot knows one or more of the angle/ altitude/ wind speed/landing conditions/ speed factor(s) is just simply not right, and yet attempts cram it in there so to speak and suffers - can lead to a lost of lift / a hard landing, and very bad things. I don't know the specifics of what happened to the F35 incident, but generally, - if any doubt, go around holds.
Generally speaking, that's true. But at the "boat", those making an arrested landing are not permitted to call their own own wave off. The only person that can call for the wave off is the LSO. You can hear the LSO frantically calling for the waveoff in the audio of the mishap.
 
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