Should they increase the Service Academy Commitment

Army Al

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I haven't seen this question being posted before. If it has, I apologize.

The Senate Armed Committee this year is discussing possibly increasing the Academies service obligation. This is on their agenda due to the following reason. Over the last several Decades, the Service Academies and full ROTC scholarship graduates are leaving active duty earlier than other commissioning sources. 5 and dive is much alive. Poor rate of return on investment in the eyes of the Senate Armed Committee.

What, if anything should be done on increasing the academies service commitment?

As of 3 June 20, the Army increased the pilot commitment from 6 to 10 years upon completion of training to take effect 1 Oct 20. Their main reason in doing so was the lower retention rate for aviators and the expense of pilot training.

Your opinion, please. I never attended nor had a desire in attending one of the service academies. My grades alone would have prevented me from consideration.
 
This was recently discussed in another thread, and the link below is my response, which is essentially what I would say here.
 
There is a fundamental tension that the service academy and full ROTC scholarship selection process. These processes are designed to choose the best candidates they can attract for obvious reasons. The tension comes from the fact that those who earn appointments or full scholarships are positioned in life to take advantage of multiple opportunities.

If someone has the standard resume that these cadets due, they are more likely to succeed than the general population. If they continue their progress, earn degrees in engineering or mathematics and perform well, they will have significant opportunities available to them outside of the military when their commitment is complete. If they are in this group of high performing people, they likely have competitive drive and ambition.

Take a high performing, ambitious, driven individual and then put them on a rigid promotion schedule that most likely will have them paid and promoted like their counterparts who underperform them and you create motivation to consider another career. I have never known anyone to get promoted to Captain below the zone. Few can get to Major below the zone. That puts these folks on the same promotion schedule as everyone else for likely the first 10 to 12 years.

Most of the people in this group understand going in that they are serving their country, performing a fulfilling mission, are prepared to move every few years, and accept a loss of some freedom in life choices. They know these sacrifices, they discuss these with others and prepare for them when possible so they can meet these challenges head on. However, the sacrifice of opportunity and advancement is not addressed.

The system is designed to foster competitiveness. What slot you get can depend on your class rank. Selection to special schools will be based on performance. The cadets are trained for four years to be the best. Then when on Active Duty, the system changes a bit. Sure, high performers may still get access to certain career fields and assignments over others, but they will likely still get promoted like everyone else in the first half of their career. Add to this, the possibility that they work for someone who isn't exceptional and their motivation can drop significantly.

To be completely fair, this is my perspective because this is how I and my friends felt so it is certainly biased. My friends and I were all Academy or Scholarship ROTC. One left, got an MBA and went to work for an Investment bank. One left, went to Stanford Law and then a VC fund. A third, left got a MS Comp Sci and went to work for Google. The fourth, separated went into industry and eventually became an officer of the company. A fifth stayed and retired as an O-5. All of us were motivated. All of us believed in what we were doing. None of us left for the money. We left because of the bureaucracy, slow advancement and lack of a challenge. We believed we could do more than we were given the chance to do.

I readily admit that a portion of that sentiment comes from the naivety of youth. We were young and thought more of ourselves than we should have. Yes we went on to be successful, but still our youthful arrogance was not fully justified. But, it was partially justified. And when you take a group of young people who are bright, driven and ambitious; train them to always seek to be #1; tell them they are the best the country has to offer; fill them with inspirational quotes about challenging yourself and becoming the best you that you can be, you are creating people who want advancement and challenge and who expectations of their leaders. No doubt, others have been through the same system and were blessed with great bosses and assignments that challenged them, or at least had enough that could be described that way so that they could weather the bad boss/assignment.

The first and second job assignments for a young officer are crucial to their development and mindset. If you get a lackluster organization and/or boss like my friends and I did, you sour quickly on the military. As a young man/woman, you lack the perspective of age and experience and instead, project those first few years of dull work and unsipiring leaders into the future so they look for another opportunity. Those who excelled in college or Academy have plenty of opportunity outside the military so many of us pursue that.

Extending the commitment for pilots makes sense, I was USAF so we have been used to that. For other officers though, extending the commitment by one year, is probably not a huge deal. More than that though and you will hurt your chances of getting the best. An 18 year committing to the next 9 years of their life is a lot (4 college/academy + 5 active duty) and is a challenge. My son wants to be a pilot in USAF so he is looking at 4 + 10 to 12 years locked up. The next 14 to 16 years of his life? Thats along time for an 18y old. One of the things that helped him join USAFA is that he can pivot during USAFA and go non-rated and only have a 5 year commitment. Still young enough to go to grad school and pursue another career if he chooses, but still has the option to go rated if he wants to.

A better way to increase retention is to focus more on the first two assignments. Make sure the officers in charge of 2Lt and 1Lt are some of your best.
 
There is a fundamental tension that the service academy and full ROTC scholarship selection process. These processes are designed to choose the best candidates they can attract for obvious reasons. The tension comes from the fact that those who earn appointments or full scholarships are positioned in life to take advantage of multiple opportunities.

If someone has the standard resume that these cadets due, they are more likely to succeed than the general population. If they continue their progress, earn degrees in engineering or mathematics and perform well, they will have significant opportunities available to them outside of the military when their commitment is complete. If they are in this group of high performing people, they likely have competitive drive and ambition.

Take a high performing, ambitious, driven individual and then put them on a rigid promotion schedule that most likely will have them paid and promoted like their counterparts who underperform them and you create motivation to consider another career. I have never known anyone to get promoted to Captain below the zone. Few can get to Major below the zone. That puts these folks on the same promotion schedule as everyone else for likely the first 10 to 12 years.

Most of the people in this group understand going in that they are serving their country, performing a fulfilling mission, are prepared to move every few years, and accept a loss of some freedom in life choices. They know these sacrifices, they discuss these with others and prepare for them when possible so they can meet these challenges head on. However, the sacrifice of opportunity and advancement is not addressed.

The system is designed to foster competitiveness. What slot you get can depend on your class rank. Selection to special schools will be based on performance. The cadets are trained for four years to be the best. Then when on Active Duty, the system changes a bit. Sure, high performers may still get access to certain career fields and assignments over others, but they will likely still get promoted like everyone else in the first half of their career. Add to this, the possibility that they work for someone who isn't exceptional and their motivation can drop significantly.

To be completely fair, this is my perspective because this is how I and my friends felt so it is certainly biased. My friends and I were all Academy or Scholarship ROTC. One left, got an MBA and went to work for an Investment bank. One left, went to Stanford Law and then a VC fund. A third, left got a MS Comp Sci and went to work for Google. The fourth, separated went into industry and eventually became an officer of the company. A fifth stayed and retired as an O-5. All of us were motivated. All of us believed in what we were doing. None of us left for the money. We left because of the bureaucracy, slow advancement and lack of a challenge. We believed we could do more than we were given the chance to do.

I readily admit that a portion of that sentiment comes from the naivety of youth. We were young and thought more of ourselves than we should have. Yes we went on to be successful, but still our youthful arrogance was not fully justified. But, it was partially justified. And when you take a group of young people who are bright, driven and ambitious; train them to always seek to be #1; tell them they are the best the country has to offer; fill them with inspirational quotes about challenging yourself and becoming the best you that you can be, you are creating people who want advancement and challenge and who expectations of their leaders. No doubt, others have been through the same system and were blessed with great bosses and assignments that challenged them, or at least had enough that could be described that way so that they could weather the bad boss/assignment.

The first and second job assignments for a young officer are crucial to their development and mindset. If you get a lackluster organization and/or boss like my friends and I did, you sour quickly on the military. As a young man/woman, you lack the perspective of age and experience and instead, project those first few years of dull work and uninspiring leaders into the future so they look for another opportunity. Those who excelled in college or Academy have plenty of opportunity outside the military so many of us pursue that.

Extending the commitment for pilots makes sense, I was USAF so we have been used to that. For other officers though, extending the commitment by one year, is probably not a huge deal. More than that though and you will hurt your chances of getting the best. An 18 year committing to the next 9 years of their life is a lot (4 college/academy + 5 active duty) and is a challenge. My son wants to be a pilot in USAF so he is looking at 4 + 10 to 12 years locked up. The next 14 to 16 years of his life? That's along time for an 18y old. One of the things that helped him join USAFA is that he can pivot during USAFA and go non-rated and only have a 5 year commitment. Still young enough to go to grad school and pursue another career if he chooses, but still has the option to go rated if he wants to.

A better way to increase retention is to focus more on the first two assignments. Make sure the officers in charge of 2Lt and 1Lt are some of your best.

Excellent response. But the Senate Armed Committee may not see it that way. Were you an AFA grad? Is so, which aircraft did you fly?
 
I agree with BuckeyeDad20 so much. My question is why do so many leave? My opinion and experience is it's not the money, titles or other things. It's because of so much that was mentioned above. I agree on focusing on the first two assignments and great mentors. I learned more about what would of been available to be as a Marine in uniform after I got out while working in the beltway for the USMC. I received my 7th MOS pick at TBS and last duty station pick. Never once was able to speak to a detailer or career counselor. They could of cared less about us. I wasn't happy, but I went in eager to do it my best in the fleet. I then got sent to a collateral billet on day 1 in the fleet and never did my job for my first 9 months. I then submitted a lat move package that had been fully endorsed by my command. Denied. I then got sent to my last duty station pick again after a year in Okinawa. Luckily I spent most of my time deployed at my next duty station. I loved being deployed and doing Marine things, it's what I had always wanted to do! I had zero intention of five and dive, but I did. I was exhausted mentally and physically from nearly 2 years deployed in some really bad places. I had somehow managed to knock out a Masters and appropriate grade PME early during my last duty station while being almost entirely deployed. I was due to rotate to a B billet and was told no, staying in the fleet for another year. I asked for a 90 day break before my next deployment and got told no, I had a few weeks to head right back to the place I came from. I knew what I was walking into and could have if given a break. So I dropped papers and got out. Honestly, the Marine Corps didn't care about me. They cared about the slot or number that I filled. They cared I met a quota. Overall I am thankful for my time at USNA and in the Marine Corps, but overall my Marine Corps experience did not measure up to what I thought it would (I think some of that was related to my MOS and why I wanted to lat move). Overall, I do think the commitment for a SA grad should go back to 6 years minimum.
 
I do not disdain those who choose to leave the service after five years. They have served honorably, fulfilled their commitment, and deserve no less respect than career officers. No one goes to a service academy to attain wealth, even those entering without the intent of a military career - there are much quicker paths to riches for any individual with the talent to obtain an appointment.

It seems odd that presumably intelligent members of the Senate Armed Services Committee would only address one aspect of the retention equation, length of service commitment, and ignore other factors that arguably have a greater effect on retention - compensation, work environment, and living conditions. The military pay scale and working/living conditions during the first five years compares well to civilian employment, but drops off considerably thereafter.

Focusing on length of service commitment without analyzing other factors is analogous to patching a leak without identifying what caused the leak in the first place. It is also likely to have unexpected negative consequences if the root causes of poor retention are not addressed.
 
First off, the actual Senate Armed Services Committee is not making these noises, rather it is a couple of committee staffers. Committee staffers can
be powerful but they are not the actual deciders.

That said, the issues with commitment vary quite a bit depending on Service Selection/MOS and in some cases, the services really don't WANT people hanging around for extra years. One year would not be much of a problem but beyond that, it can become a "where do I put them" issue.

I wrote this in another thread.

Significant second order effects for some branches because of career path differences between them. I know more about the Navy and can tell you that a Surface Warfare officer at the five year point has typically either finished or is close to finishing their required Division Officer Sea Tour (s) which is typically followed by shore duty which can often include an advanced degree program. It is a pretty good time to leave if that is what is desired OR a Navy funded advanced degree that is followed by the Department Head track which is typically where officers promote to O4. A ten year commitment forces officers to stay into the Department head tours which ends up keeping too many people without enough appropriate billets. The normal rank pyramid is seen on a ship with far more Division Officers than Department Heads. While there are year groups that are low on/could use more Department Heads, the shortage number is MUCH smaller than the number that would have been added by doubling the obligated service.

Submarine Officers have additional schooling on the front end but eventually have a similar career path to SWOs - a ten year obligation would yield many more officers where you DON'T need them.

I could be wrong but I expect that the Army does not need as many officers at the 9 year point as they need to commission each year.

Aviation does call for a longer obligation (though not necessarily ten years) because the lengthy qualification process "eats up" so much of a newly commissioned officer's normal obligated service. For a Navy Pilot, they can easily be past the 3 year point before they ever set foot in a fleet squadron and if the Navy wants to "get" 3 or 4 years of fleet service out of them, the normal (5 yr) obligation is significantly too short. Due to the organization of fleet squadrons, this is not a huge problem as the Division Officer/Department Head slots are manned differently.
 
Interesting. Seems to me the best way to get a better Return on Investment is to invest more in the resource (new officer). Increasing the service requirement by one year is treating the symptom rather than addressing the root cause (why don't officers stay longer, and how do we incentivize and motivate them to do so). Merely saying the services are free to change the terms is, in my mind, avoiding the real question.
 
Interesting. Seems to me the best way to get a better Return on Investment is to invest more in the resource (new officer). Increasing the service requirement by one year is treating the symptom rather than addressing the root cause (why don't officers stay longer, and how do we incentivize and motivate them to do so). Merely saying the services are free to change the terms is, in my mind, avoiding the real question.
So if you increase retention significantly, what do you do with them? We have a rank pyramid which corresponds to positions/jobs. If the Army infantry suddenly starts retaining a lot more officers, where do you put them? Platoon command is for O1s and O2s. If you now have a lot more O3's, you aren't going to have more companies for them to command and you can't send them back down to platoons either. You only have son many spots at the different staffs and other activities, what do you do when they are filled?

Very much the same for the Navy with SWOs and Submariners
 
^^Good points by @OldRetSWO

It’s a balancing act.

DOPMA caps in each officer pay grade set the parameters. If retention is too good, then promotion slows to the rate of molasses on a snow drift, because of the lower rate of attrition and the “plug” in the promotion flow. At times the services have had to resort to what is euphemistically called “force shaping” methods. In the past, O-4s, not guaranteed a statutory retirement at 20 years, but were usually allowed to stay to 20, were forced out, some with a “package,” some not. O-3s who had completed their ADSOs or who had not augmented their Reserve commission to Regular received letters thanking them for their service and advising them additional orders would not be issued, regardless of their career desires, and steering them toward joining the Reserve. It was an ugly time.
 
I have to believe family life has a lot to do with retention. Deployment, after deployment, after deployment can get old when you are trying to build a life with a family. Being away from your spouse and children can be very taxing.
 
Interesting. Seems to me the best way to get a better Return on Investment is to invest more in the resource (new officer). Increasing the service requirement by one year is treating the symptom rather than addressing the root cause (why don't officers stay longer, and how do we incentivize and motivate them to do so). Merely saying the services are free to change the terms is, in my mind, avoiding the real question.

You are not the only person asking this question.

From today's WSJ. It's kind of long, but approaches the question of retention from the standpoint its cost in loss of talent, rather than the cost of training the next cohort. Bold italics are mine.

The Navy’s Cultural Ship Is Listing
The service is trying to do too much with too little public support, as the chain of command frays.

In the U.S. Navy, “shock trials” involve taking a warship to sea and conducting drills to see how well she might absorb the stress of combat. The Navy has lately experienced institutional shock trials: bribery scandals, collisions and sundry other public-relations nightmares. This week in San Diego the USS Bonhomme Richard, a $750 million amphibious assault ship, caught fire and burned for days. Earlier this year, Capt. Brett Crozier was relieved of command of the USS Theodore Roosevelt after writing a letter saying he needed to move his sailors off the aircraft carrier to arrest an outbreak of the novel coronavirus.

High-profile mishaps and unwanted publicity point to an overarching problem: For several years the Navy has been forced to do too much with too little, a debate that deserves wider attention. The Navy also seems to be suffering from a cultural dysfunction in the chain of command. To repair it, the Navy will need to reinvent its process for refining leaders and perhaps even the service’s broader mission. What’s at stake is the quality of American military talent that fights the next war—an eventuality that seems less far-fetched amid the tense mood of a global pandemic.

The 2017 crashes in the Western Pacific involving the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald still loom large in the Navy. An investigation revealed that Pacific fleet ships were going to sea with too little training and that crews weren’t skilled in the basics of sea navigation. Also implicated was the Navy’s “can do” culture—the propensity of naval officers to try to get the job done no matter the cost.
“Interviews revealed that, particularly among ships based in Japan, crews perceived their Commanding Officer was unable to say ‘no’ regardless of unit-level consequence,” according to a 177-page “comprehensive review” of the 2017 incidents. Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin, who commanded the Seventh Fleet during the collisions, wrote in a naval publication that he’d “made clear” to his superiors “the impact of increased operational demand on training and maintenance well prior” to the accidents. Despite “explicitly stated concerns,” he wrote, “the direction we received was to execute the mission.” He was fired shortly after the accidents.

In 2015, a submarine ran aground in Florida, resulting in $1 million in damage. The Navy fired Capt. David Adams, the officer in command when the accident occurred. Journalist Hope Hodge Seck of Military.com made a public-records request for the 475-page investigation, the details of which she published in March. Capt. Adams had warned his superiors that his crew was too inexperienced to handle a precarious predawn return to port. He was nevertheless told to execute the mission.
The Navy’s tradition of firing commanding officers who fail is a venerable one, and the Navy has tried to absorb the lessons of these incidents. But as Ms. Seck notes, the sub mishap “came against the backdrop of a Navy grappling with a culture in which overworked and unready crews were regularly put underway in service of operational needs.” The careers of commanders like Capt. Adams can look like the casualties.
The Roosevelt is a confounding example. The Navy’s investigation makes a strong case for removing Capt. Crozier. He failed to rein in the ship’s senior medical officer, who, according to the Navy’s investigation, was predicting up to 50 virus deaths on the ship and threatening to take the medical department’s grim case to the press. (One sailor assigned to the Roosevelt died from complications of Covid-19.)
Yet the Navy’s report also details how the Roosevelt’s leadership became frustrated with its superiors at Seventh Fleet headquarters over the chaotic process of moving sailors off the ship. The fleet proposed moving thousands of sailors from Guam to Okinawa, Japan, nine hours away by plane. Capt. Crozier and his colleagues thought this impractical and had been asking to move the entire crew into hotel rooms on Guam, where the situation on the ground was deteriorating. Some sailors were temporarily quartered in open-bay gyms on Guam, and the number of cases among the crew was rising.
The ship’s top officers, the Navy’s June report says, “felt they had been distracted by numerous” requests for information “from higher headquarters,” and “that in the end, they were going to be made to stay in the makeshift berthing on Guam, long-term, which they viewed as worse than the ship.” The Navy insists Capt. Crozier’s eventual letter was unnecessary, but in a conflict at sea this culture of distrust could have been deadly. Whatever else was going on here, there was dysfunction in the chain of command.

In an organization as large as the Navy, improving the culture—an amorphous concept—is difficult. Adding to the challenge are the distinct subcultures found in Navy communities, from aviation to the submarine service. The “Fat Leonard” bribery scandal implicated many senior officers. The ship accidents took down more in the Pacific. Talent developed over decades went out the door in a matter of a few years.
“When you start adding all these things up,” says Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin, a Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, “what it all equals is a generation of our best naval officers has been wiped out.” Had China’s military “a decade ago decided it wanted to wipe out some of our most talented officers, it probably couldn’t have done a better job than we’ve done ourselves.”
The priority should be developing and retaining a new generation of naval leaders. Guy Snodgrass, a now retired Navy pilot, wrote an internal memo in 2014 while on active duty, later published in the Naval War College Review, stating that the Navy’s system of managing talent “tends to focus heavily on the quantitative needs of the service at the expense of retaining the right officers.” Mr. Snodgrass found that commanding officers who still had more potentially productive years ahead of them in the Navy were packing it in, and too many officers were leaving the ranks after 10 years, even with no pension. One complaint: Service members “perceive a withdrawal of decision-making power from operational commanders.”

Promotion is predicated on what service members call “hitting the wickets”—slaloming down a preset career path, getting the right experience in the right jobs at the right time. It’s an anachronistic process that doesn’t necessarily develop skills and sound judgment. Jobs tend to last 24 or 36 months, which erodes expertise and accountability on board ships that need those qualities in abundance to operate effectively. Service members ride out the consequences of decisions made by others who have left the building or even the Navy.
Operationally, the Navy needs a culture shift. Congress lacks the political will to fund the ever-expanding commitments with which civilian leadership saddles the Navy. The downward pressure on the military budget will be more severe as Congress spends trillions of dollars responding to the coronavirus.
Yet the Navy’s operational tempo is rising. Take the unsustainable pace of deployed aircraft carriers and their strike groups. The USS Abraham Lincoln strike group in January finished a 295-day deployment, the longest of any carrier since the end of the Cold War. (“While her extension was the best decision we could offer to support the demand for forces,” Navy leaders told Congress in March prepared testimony, “it does not come without consequences,” such as longer and more expensive maintenance.) The carrier USS Harry S. Truman recently completed two deployments in close succession. Another carrier, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, last month set a record of 161 consecutive days at sea without a normal stop in port for a pause due to the coronavirus.

The Navy in June had three carrier strike groups operating in the Pacific, an impressive show of force that may cost something later in overworked crews. The Navy and its political masters will have to decide whether the priority is “presence”—being on patrol everywhere—or “war fighting,” a distinction Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute makes to me.
One promising development is candor from Navy Secretary Kenneth Braithwaite, a retired rear admiral and former ambassador to Norway, who told senators at his confirmation hearing earlier this year that the department was in “rough waters” due to “a breakdown in the trust of those leading the service.” He invoked the late management guru Peter Drucker, whose insights about corporate management perhaps apply in war: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.”

Mrs. Odell is an editorial page writer for the Journal.
 
First sentence is very wrong. Shock trials are "conducting drills", they are blowing up large explosives at predetermined distances from a ship to check workmanship and to assure that the ship will survive near misses in battle.
 
I give little credibility to anything a journalist who has never served writes about the military or about leadership . Much of what she is describing could have been written in the '80's-so that's not the problem leading to the recent problems. Yes, there are problems within the Navy, and I am not close enough to put my finger on it, but largely suspect that it arises from the fact that the Navy reflects society as a whole.
 
I wonder if Service Academy graduates already feel like they have served 4 years by the time they get out, as opposed to ROTC or other commissioning sources. So add 5 on that, then they feel like it has been 9 years.
 
I wonder if Service Academy graduates already feel like they have served 4 years by the time they get out, as opposed to ROTC or other commissioning sources. So add 5 on that, then they feel like it has been 9 years.
"Ouch" said all all ROTC officers everywhere. The 4 years were somewhat different and perhaps less intense, but they still did 4 years as well.
 
"Ouch" said all all ROTC officers everywhere.

They would only say "Ouch", if there were value in the comment.

According to my AROTC O-3 DS, WPers, generally, don't display that kind of attitude. At least in his cohort they are too focused on the present and the immediate future to care about something 5 years in the past. For him, like his SA buddies, the commission or the name on the diploma was not the goal, but rather a gateway.
 
They would only say "Ouch", if there were value in the comment.

According to my AROTC O-3 DS, WPers, generally, don't display that kind of attitude. At least in his cohort they are too focused on the present and the immediate future to care about something 5 years in the past. For him, like his SA buddies, the commission or the name on the diploma was not the goal, but rather a gateway.

I agree. My DS had a mix of WP, OCS and ROTC in his ABOLC class at Ft. Benning that he just completed. (He is now at SLC, formerly known as ARC)

Literally NO ONE CARED about HOW they got there. The main focus was how good a peer you were and could you carry your weight.
 
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